Lightweight Bitcoin clients are gaining increasing adoption among Bitcoin users, owing to their reduced resource and bandwidth consumption. These clients support a simplified payment verification (SPV) mode as they are only required to download and verify a part of the block chain-thus supporting the usage of Bitcoin on constrained devices, such as smartphones. SPV clients rely on Bloom filters to receive transactions that are relevant to their local wallet. These filters embed all the Bitcoin addresses used by the SPV clients, and are outsourced to more powerful Bitcoin nodes which then only forward to those clients transactions relevant to their outsourced Bloom filters.
INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin has already witnessed a wider adoption and attention than any other digital currency proposed to date. Bitcoin implements a distributed time-stamping service [25] , which operates on top of the Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network and ensures that all transactions and their order of execution are visible to all Bitcoin users.
Currently, a typical Bitcoin installation requires more than 18 GB of disk space, and requires considerable time to download and locally index blocks and transactions that are contained in the block chain. In addition to disk space usage, the continuous growth of Bitcoin's transactional volume [1] incurs considerable overhead on the Bitcoin clients that need to verify the correctness of broadcasted Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ACSAC '14 blocks and transactions in the network. This problem becomes even more evident when users wish to perform/verify Bitcoin payments using resource-constraint devices, such as mobile devices.
To remedy this, the Bitcoin developers released a lightweight client, BitcoinJ [2] , which supports a simplified payment verification (SPV) mode where only a small part of the block chain is downloaded-thus supporting the typical usage of Bitcoin on constrained devices (e.g., smartphones, cheap virtual private servers). SPV clients were originally proposed by Nakamoto in [25] and were later extended to rely on Bloom filters [17] in order to receive transactions that are relevant to their local wallet. These Bloom filters embed all the addresses used by the SPV clients, and are outsourced to more powerful Bitcoin nodes; these nodes will then forward to the SPV clients those transactions relevant to their Bloom filters.
Bloom filters can be defined with a target false positive rate; by appropriately setting the target false positive rate of Bloom filters, Bitcoin developers aim to provide a suitable anonymity set to hide the addresses of SPV clients. As far as we are aware, the information leakage associated with the reliance on Bloom filters has not been yet thoroughly analyzed in the context of Bitcoin [2] .
In this paper, we address this problem, and explore the privacy provisions due to the use of Bloom filters in existing SPV client implementations. We show analytically and empirically that the current integration of Bloom filters within Bitcoin leaks considerable information about the addresses of Bitcoin users. More specifically, we show that the information leakage due to Bloom filters significantly depends on the number of addresses that each user possesses; notably, users who have a modest number of addresses (< 20) risk leaking all of their addresses by embedding them in a Bloom filter. This information leakage is further exacerbated when nodes restart their client, or generate additional Bitcoin addresses to their SPV clients; in these cases, the SPV clients re-compute new Bloom filters. We show that the computation of new Bloom filters considerably reduces the privacy of SPV clients.
Our work therefore motivates a careful assessment of the current implementation of SPV clients, prior to any large-scale deployment. In this work, we make the following contributions:
• We show that considerable information about users who possess a modest number of Bitcoin addresses (e.g., < 20) is leaked by a single Bloom filter in existing SPV clients.
• We show that an adversary can easily link different Bloom filters which embed the same elements-irrespective of the target false positive rate. This also enables the adversary to link, with high confidence, different Bloom filters which pertain to the same originator.
• We show that a considerable number of the addresses of users are leaked if the adversary can collect at least two Bloom filters issued by the same SPV client-irrespective of the target false positive rate and of the number of user addresses.
• Finally, we propose a lightweight and efficient countermeasure to enhance the privacy offered by SPV clients. Our countermeasure can be integrated with minimum modifications within existing SPV client implementations. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly overview the operation of SPV clients. In Section 3, we introduce our system and attacker model. In Section 4, we analyze the privacy provisions of existing SPV client implementations when the adversary captures a single Bloom filter of an SPV client. In Section 5, we discuss the information leakage when the adversary can acquire multiple Bloom filters of an SPV node. In Section 6, we propose an efficient solution to enhance the privacy of users in SPV clients. In Section 7, we review related work in the area and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
BACKGROUND
Bitcoin enables its users to perform payments by issuing transactions to Bitcoin addresses. A Bitcoin address corresponds to a public key, whose corresponding secret key enables the address owner to spend the BTCs stored in the respective address. In order to spend BTCs, a user first creates a transaction, which typically takes as inputs the outputs of earlier transactions addressed to his addresses, and specifies as outputs the Bitcoin addresses (or their corresponding public keys) which will collect the resulting BTCs. Finally, the user signs the transaction and broadcasts it into the Bitcoin peer-to-peer (P2P) network.
Transactions are included and stored into Bitcoin blocks. Blocks are generated (or mined) by solving a hash-based proof-of-work (PoW) scheme. Bitcoin requires all peers in the system to verify all broadcasted transactions and blocks. Clearly, this comes at the expense of storage and computational overhead. Currently, a typical Bitcoin installation requires more than 18 GB of disk space, and considerable time to download and locally index blocks and transactions that are contained in the block chain. Additionally, the continuous growth of Bitcoin transactional volume incurs significant computational overhead on the Bitcoin clients, when verifying the correctness of broadcasted blocks and transactions in the network. This problem becomes even more evident when users wish to perform/verify Bitcoin payments from resource-constrained devices such as mobile devices, tablets, etc.
To remedy that, lightweight client implementations (or simplified payment verification, SPV) have been proposed in [25] ; SPV clients do not store the entire block chain, nor do they validate all transactions in the system. Notably, SPV clients only perform a limited amount of verifications, such as the verification of block difficulty and the presence of a transaction in the Merkle tree, etc., and offload the verification of all transactions and blocks to the full Bitcoin nodes. Note that in order to calculate their own balance, SPV clients request full blocks from a given block height on; here, the full Bitcoin nodes can also provide "filtered blocks" to the SPV client that only contain relevant transactions from each block.
Unlike full Bitcoin nodes, SPV clients do not receive all the transactions that are broadcasted within the Bitcoin P2P network, but instead receive a subset of transactions, filtered for them by the full nodes to which they are connected 1 . To reduce bandwidth consumption, SPV clients make use of Bloom filters [17] . A Bloom filter [12] is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure which is used to test membership of an element. An SPV client constructs Figure 1 : Sketch of the operation undergone by an SPV client. SPV clients connect to a full Bitcoin node, which only forwards to the SPV clients the transactions relevant to their Bloom filters.
a Bloom filter by embedding all the Bitcoin addresses which appear in its wallets. Upon connection to a full Bitcoin node, the constructed Bloom filter is outsourced to the full node following an initial handshake protocol (cf. Figure 1) . Whenever the full node receives a transaction, it first checks to see if its input and/or output addresses match the SPV client's Bloom filter. If so, the full node forwards the received transaction to the SPV client.
Bloom filters have been first proposed by Bloom in 1970; we refer the readers to [13] for detailed information on Bloom filters. In SPV clients [2] , a Bloom filter B of an SPV client is specified by the maximum number of elements that it can fit, denoted by M , without exceeding its target false-positive rate Pt. Let m ≤ M denote the number of elements that are inserted in B(M, Pt). In SPV clients, the size of the filter n is computed as follows:
A Bloom filter B basically consists of an array B [.] of n bits accessed by k independent hash functions H1(.), . . . , H k (.), each of which maps an input string x ∈ {0, 1} * to one of the n bits of the array. In SPV clients, k is computed as follows:
To insert an element [13, 21] . In this paper, we focus on the proposal due to Mullin et al. [21] to estimate the false positive rates in Bloom filters (which is computed over all possible inputs to the Bloom filter). More specifically, we compute the false positive rate of a filter B(M, Pt) which has m elements, P f (m), as follows [13] :
We acknowledge that there might be more accurate techniques for computing the false positive rates (e.g., [13] ); our findings, however, show that the difference in false positives resulting from [13] and [21] was negligible and did not affect our results. We therefore elected to rely on the estimation of P f which appears in [21] .
Here, note that P f (M ) ≈ Pt. That is, the target false positive rate of a Bloom filter is only reached when the number of elements contained in the filter matches M .
MODEL
We assume that lightweight SPV clients connect to the Bitcoin P2P network through full Bitcoin nodes. As described earlier, full nodes only inform the SPV clients about transactions specific to their corresponding Bloom filters.
We assume that the adversary can compromise one or more full Bitcoin nodes and eavesdrop on communication links in order to acquire one or more Bloom filters pertaining to an SPV client. Here, the goal of the adversary is to identify the Bitcoin addresses that are inserted within a Bloom filter created by a particular SPV client. The addresses inserted in the Bloom filter typically correspond to addresses that the SPV client is interested in receiving information about (e.g., these addresses typically belong to the wallet of the SPV client). For example, the adversary might be connected to the node which generated the Bloom filter or might try to assign an identity to nodes according to their addresses, etc. Note that since the Bitcoin network provides currently less than 10,000 reachable full Bitcoin nodes, it is likely that regular nodes receive one or more filter pertaining to each SPV client over a sufficiently long period of time.
In our analysis, we assume that the adversary knows the parameters used to create a Bloom filter. This includes, for instance, the target false positive rate, Pt, that the Bloom filter is designed to achieve, and the number of hash functions k used in the Bloom filter. Since Bitcoin is an open payment system, we also assume that the adversary has access to all addresses/transactions which appear in the block chain, and to their respective order of execution.
Clearly, we assume that the adversary is computationally bounded. However, since the Bitcoin network only contains a bounded number of addresses (around 33 million Bitcoin addresses), the adversary can simply check whether all existing addresses match to a given Bloom filter.
Note that an adversary who is connected to an SPV client can see the transactions issued by the client and could potentially use this in order to learn the clients' addresses. This can be countered e.g., by SPV clients using TOR whenever they issue Bitcoin transactions. Instead, in this work, we focus on analyzing the privacy issues of the use of Bloom filters within existing SPV client implementations, which as we show, cannot be solved by simply relying on anonymizing networks.
Let B refer to the set of all existing Bitcoin addresses. Furthermore, let Bi refer to the set of all elements y in B that are members of Bloom filter Bi (i.e., for which a query in Bi returns true), and Fi ⊂ Bi denote the set of false positives of Bi.
In our analysis, we assume that all elements map uniformly at random to the bits of the Bloom filter; that is, we assume that all addresses y ∈ Bi are equally likely to be a true member of Bi.
We further assume that the adversary can collect additional information from the system which can help her classify (a fraction of) the false positives exhibited by Bloom filters; for example, the adversary can try to identify some false positives generated by filters by analyzing two different Bloom filters which embed the same true positives (cf. Section 5). We capture this additional knowledge using the set K ⊆ Fi which contains addresses in Fi that the adversary can correctly classify. We acknowledge that the adversary could also try to gather prior knowledge about the addresses inserted in the Bloom filter; in this work, we focus however on the case where the adversary does not have any prior knowledge about the true positives of the filter.
Our analysis throughout the rest of the paper does not exploit the fact that the adversary knows the public keys of Bitcoin addresses. Indeed, in current implementations of SPV clients, both the addresses and their public keys are inserted in the outsourced Bloom filter. As such, if the adversary knows both the address and its public key, then she can trivially test whether an address is a true positive of the filter by checking whether both the address and its public key are inserted within the filter. If not, then it is highly likely that the address is a false positive of the filter. We believe that the inclusion of both the address and its public key in the Bloom filter is a severe flaw in the current SPV client implementations-and can be easily countered; we thus do not exploit this flaw in our analysis. In fact, more than 99% of all Bitcoin transactions consist of payments to Bitcoin addresses (or the public key hash); moreover, only 4587 out of 33 million total addresses in the system received transactions destined for both their public keys and their public key hashes 2 . This means that for the vast majority of Bitcoin clients, there is no need to include both the public keys and their hashes (i.e., the Bitcoin addresses) in the Bloom filters; inserting one or the other would suffice (in more than 99% of the cases) 3 .
Privacy Metric.
We quantify the privacy offered by a Bloom filter using the probability, P h (j) , that the adversary correctly guesses any j true positives of a Bloom filter among all positives that match the filter and which are not included in the knowledge of the adversary. More specifically, we measure P h (j) achieved by a Bloom filter Bi, as follows:
. . . . Here, N refers to the number of Bitcoin addresses inserted into Bi, and S denotes the cardinality of the set {Fi−K}; S therefore corresponds to all false positives that match Bi, but for which the adversary does not have any knowledge about. Therefore, the probability that the adversary correctly guesses all the addresses of Bi is given by:
. Clearly, the higher is P h (.) , the smaller is the privacy of the SPV node. Note that if the adversary is able to identify an SPV client (e.g., by some side channel information), then simply identifying any address pertaining to that client would be a considerable violation of its privacy. Otherwise, if the adversary can link a number of addresses to the same anonymous client, then the information offered by the clustering of these addresses offers the adversary considerable information about the profile of the client, such as its purchasing habits, etc.
Note that our privacy metric only assesses the probability of guessing addresses inserted within the Bloom filter. As mentioned earlier, these are the addresses that the SPV client is interested in receiving information about. P h (.) , however, does not necessarily capture the probability of guessing addresses which belong to the user of the SPV client. Indeed, addresses inserted within the filter do not necessarily have to belong to the user; for instance, the privacy of users-who only embed in their Bloom filters L ≤ N addresses-can be quantified by computing Table 1 summarizes the notation used throughout the paper.
INFORMATION LEAKAGE DUE TO A SINGLE BLOOM FILTER
In this section, we start by analyzing the privacy provisions of existing SPV clients when the adversary acquires a single Bloom filter pertaining to an SPV client. In Section 5, we address the case when multiple Bloom filters are acquired by the adversary. Target false positive rate P h (j) Probability of correctly guessing any j true positives X Number of bits in the Bloom filter set to one Table 1 : Notations used throughout the paper.
Leakage under a Single Bloom Filter
In existing SPV clients (which use the Bitcoinj library), a node initializes its Bloom filter Bi with a random nonce r, and specifies its target false positive rate Pt which can be achieved when a number of elements M have been inserted in the filter. M is equal to M = m + 100 = 2N + 100, where N is the number of Bitcoin addresses inserted in Bi. 4 Note that a Bitcoin address is inserted into the Bloom filter by adding both the corresponding public key and the public key hash to the filter; therefore m = 2N .
By default, the target false positive rate of the Bloom filter Pt is set to 0.05% 5 . The size of the filter n and the number of hashes k are computed given Equations 1 and 2, respectively.
Note that at initialization time, the SPV client is only equipped with j = 1 Bitcoin address. The corresponding Bloom filter will then be initially created to fit M = 102 elements, and will only contain m = 2 elements. However, if the SPV client restarts (e.g., mobile phone reboots, mobile application is restarted), then the Bloom filter will be re-computed with M = 2j + 100 (the SPV client stores the Bloom filter in volatile memory). In either cases, when the user acquires 50 or more additional addresses such that m > M, then the SPV client will resize the Bloom filter by recomputing M = 2N + 100, and will send the updated Bloom filter to the full Bitcoin nodes that it is connected to. This process reiterates whenever the number of addresses inserted in Bi increase such that m > M.
In Figure 2 , we analytically compute Pt with respect to the number of addresses N that an SPV client is equipped with. Here, we assume that the adversary has access to only one Bloom filter pertaining to the SPV client, and that the adversary has no prior knowl- 4 The additional number '100' is added to m by the Bitcoin developers in order to avoid the recomputation of a new filter in the case where a user inserts up to 50 additional Bitcoin addresses. 5 The Bitcoin developers claim that a target false positive rate of 0.1% should provide "very good privacy" [7] . edge about addresses in Bitcoin (i.e., K = φ). Note that given n and k, the number of elements contained in a Bloom filter can be estimated by the adversary as follows [26] :
Here, X corresponds to the number of bits of the Bloom filter set to one. Given n and Pt, M can also be computed by the adversary from Equation 1. Since K = φ, S + N = |Bi| (i.e., the number of all existing Bitcoin addresses which match Bi) 6 . Note that, in April 2014, the Bitcoin block chain comprised nearly |B| =33 million addresses. This means that an adversary can simply try all possible addresses in the Bitcoin system in order to compute Bi. In doing so, it is straightforward to see that:
where N |B|, and m = 2N is the number of elements contained in the Bloom filter seen by the adversary. In analyzing our findings, we distinguish two cases:
In Figure 2 , we compute Pt and P f with respect to the number of addresses N . Our results show that P h (1) (the probability of correctly guessing one address as a true positive) is large when 2N/M ≤ 0.4, as long as N < 100. Given a modest number of addresses in the Bloom filter (i.e, N < 100), P f (m = 2N ) is small when m M is small. As This means that the information leakage in SPV clients is considerable for new Bitcoin users, and for Bitcoin users which restart Given an SPV client with 5 addresses, all addresses can be guessed; when the SPV client has 20 addresses, 20% of the addresses can be guessed with almost 0.90 probability. Here, we assume that the user restarts its SPV client.
their SPV clients. For instance, at initialization time, the Bloom filter of SPV clients is typically instantiated using M = 102. Our results show that if the user is new in the Bitcoin system and only has 1 Bitcoin address, P h (1) ≈ 1, which signals complete lack of privacy. Recall that this observation also holds when the SPV client restarts and N < 100; for instance, when N = 20, m = 40,
≈ 0.98 and P h (20) ≈ 0.20 (cf. figure 4) . We validate our analysis experimentally in Section 4.2.
2) 2N/M > 0.4.
Conforming with our previous analysis, when 2N/M > 0.4, P f (m = 2N ) is close to Pt. Recall that in this case, the probability of correctly guessing one address reaches a local minimum when N = M 2 (cf. Figure 2) . Our results also show that the global minimum achieved by P h (1) is 0.002961 and is reached when the user has N = 51 addresses.
In addition, we analytically compute P h (j) when the SPV client has 5, 10, 15 and 20 addresses. Our results in Figure 4 show that guessing all addresses given one filter which embeds less than 15 addresses can be achieved with almost 0.80 probability. This probability decreases as the number of addresses embedded within the filter increases beyond 15.
Experimental Evaluation
We now proceed to validate our analytical results empirically, by means of implementation. For that purpose, we parsed the block chain from the genesis block mined in 2009 until the beginning of April 2014 using the parser in [5] and collected nearly 33 million distinct addresses. In our evaluation, we rely on Bitcoin Wallet [6] , which builds upon the standard Bitcoinj library (0.12-SNAPSHOT of end of April 2014).
As mentioned earlier, Bitcoinj initializes by constructing one address by default. The user can subsequently add addresses to his wallet. Our implementation setup is depicted in Figure 3 . Here, we construct 10 different Bitcoin wallets, and we gradually increase the number of Bitcoin addresses which populate each wallet from 1 address to 9,000 Bitcoin addresses. Whenever new addresses are added to the wallets, we compute the modified Bloom filters; we increase the number of addresses by a step of 2 addresses to reach 19 addresses, and then by a step of 5 addresses to reach 8,999 addresses. As such, our experiments resulted in the evaluation of a total of 18,060 different Bloom filters which contain various number of elements, and pertain to 10 different SPV clients. For each Bloom filter, we compute the matching set of Bitcoin addresses, we compare this set with the actual addresses inserted in each Bloom filter in order to compute S, and P h (.) . Since we assume here that the adversary has no a priori knowledge about Bitcoin addresses, S corresponds to the number of existing Bitcoin addresses (among the 33,000,000 total Bitcoin addresses) that match the Bloom filter of the SPV client, and that are not the addresses of the SPV client (i.e., S corresponds to the false positives generated by the Bloom filter).
Each data point in our experiments corresponds to the average of 10 independent measurements obtained from each of the 10 wallets. Our results (cf. Table 2 ) confirm our analysis in Section 4.1. More specifically, our results show that given few addresses (small N ), P h (.) is large; for example, when N = 19, Bi results in an average of 6.1 false positives among all 33,000,000 addresses which corresponds to P h (1) = 0.76 and P h (N/2) = 0.0433. As N increases to 49 addresses, P h (1) and P h (N/2) decrease to 0.004 and 0, respectively. Indeed, when N = 49, N/M ≈ 0.5, since initially Bi is computed with M = 102. Here, Bi incurs P f (98) ≈ Pt false positive rates. When N increases beyond 51, then m > M, and the Bloom filter is resized to fit M = 2N + 100 elements. In this case, when 2N/M is small, P h (.) is large. For instance, when N = 54, P h (1) is 0.36, which corresponds to a total of 96 false positives seen by the adversary among all addresses in B. This process re-iterates whenever Bi is resized, however as N increases, we observe that the fluctuations in P h (.) decrease as P f (2N ) converges towards Pt.
In Figure 5 , we also measure P h (1) and the number of false positives when the SPV client restarts and has to re-compute its Bloom filter Bi. As mentioned earlier, our results show that the restarting of an SPV client causes P h (1) to significantly increase when compared to the case where the client is not restarted. As mentioned earlier, at any restart and given N addresses, the SPV client recomputes Bi with a size of M = 2N + 100. Therefore, for modest values of N (e.g., N < 100), 2N/M becomes small, thus resulting in modest P f (2N ) and a large P h (1) . Our findings also show that as N increases above 500 addresses, P h (1) also increases. This is the case since the number of false positives provided by Bi is bounded by Pt|B|, and does not depend on N .
Summary.
• We show that the probability P h (.) that the attacker correctly guesses the addresses of the SPV client is large when the number N of addresses inserted in the filter is smaller than 20. For example, if the SPV client has 15 addresses in its wallet and restarts, correctly guessing all of its address can be achieved with a probability of at least P h (15) = 0.8.
• Due to addition of the constant '100' to M (the maximum number of elements the Bloom filter is designed for), the closer m (the actual number of elements in the filter) is to M , the higher is the privacy offered by the Bloom filter.
INFORMATION LEAKAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE BLOOM FILTERS
In Section 4.1, we analyzed the information leakage in the presence of an adversary who has access to a single Bloom filter instance of an SPV client. In this section, we extend our analysis to cover a more powerful adversary who can acquire multiple Bloom filters pertaining to SPV clients.
Leakage under Multiple Bloom Filters
In what follows, we assume that the adversary can acquire b > 1 Bloom filters pertaining to different users. For example, the adver-N Ph (1) Ph (1) Ph (1) 
Two Bloom Filters.
We start by analyzing the case where the adversary acquires two different Bloom filters B1 and B2. In the sequel, we focus on computing P h (.) corresponding to filter B1, which we assume to be the smallest of the two filters (in size). In analyzing the information leakage due to the acquisition of two Bloom filters, we distinguish two cases.
1) B1 and B2 pertain to different users.
Recall that each Bloom filter is initialized with a random seed, chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}
64 . Therefore, if B1 and B2 pertain to different users, then it is highly likely that they are initialized with different random seeds. This means that the false positives generated by each filter are highly likely to correspond to different addresses. Moreover, since different users will have different Bitcoin addresses, B1 and B2 will contain different elements. Therefore, B1 ∩ B2 is likely to be comprised of only few addresses, if any. Notably, when B1 and B2 pertain to different users, then |B1 ∩ B2| can be computed as follows:
where N1 corresponds to the number of elements inserted in B1.
E[|B1 ∩ B2|] is the expected number of elements which match B2
and B1. The number of elements in B which match B2 is given by P f (m2)|B|. Then, E[|B1 ∩ B2|] can be computed by assuming a binomial distribution with success probability P f (m2), and with P f (m2)|B| number of trials. Note that the adversary can compute m1 (using Equation 4); if m1 > |B1 ∩ B2|, then this offers a clear distinguisher for the adversary that the two acquired Bloom filters B1 and B2 pertain to different user wallets.
2) B1 and B2 pertain to the same user.
On the other hand, in the case where B1 and B2 correspond to the same SPV client, three sub-cases emerge: B1 and B2 use the same size/seed: This is the case when users, e.g., create additional Bitcoin addresses and need to update their outsourced Bloom filters to include those addresses. In this case, B1 and B2 are likely to comprise of similar Bitcoin addresses. This includes both the actual elements of the filters, i.e., the Bitcoin addresses of the user, and the false positives generated by the Bloom filter. In this case, |B1 ∩ B2| can be computed as follows:
Notice that |B1 ∩ B2| = S1 + N1 = |B1| (since B1 ⊂ B2); therefore, P h (j) is not affected by the acquisition of the second filter B2. B1 and B2 use different seeds: In existing SPV clients, the random nonce r used to instantiate the Bloom filter is stored in volatile memory. Therefore, each time the SPV client is restarted (e.g., smartphone reboots), a new filter will be created with a new seed chosen uniformly at random. If the adversary acquires two Bloom filters of the same user which are initialized with different seeds, then these filters are likely to exhibit different false positives. B1 and B2 will however comprise of a number of identical elements (which map to the Bitcoin addresses of the user). More specifically,
As we show in Section 5.2, the obtained P h (j) is considerably large in this case, when compared to the case where the adversary has access to only one filter. B1 and B2 use the same seed, but have different sizes: This is the case when users, e.g., create additional Bitcoin addresses beyond the capacity of their current Bloom filters. SPV clients therefore need to resize their Bloom filters. Note that filter resizing typically shuffles the bits of the Bloom filters; the resulting distribution of bits in the new resized filter is not necessarily pseudo-random (since the same seed is used) and depends on the sizes of the filters. As such, only the lower bound on |B1 ∩B2| can be estimated using Equation 12 (which estimates the worst case where filter resizing causes a pseudo-random permutation of the bits of the filters); in Section 5.2, we confirm our analysis by means of experiments. Recall that since there are only few tens of millions of addresses in Bitcoin, the adversary can brute-force search the entire list of Bitcoin addresses in order to acquire B1 and B2 and compute B1 ∩ B2. Given any two Bloom filters B1 and B2, the adversary can easily guess whether these two Bloom filters contain Bitcoin addresses from the same wallet. Indeed, if |B1 ∩ B2| is small, then it is highly likely that B1 and B2 map to different elements (if m1 and m2 are not small), and therefore pertain to different users. On the other hand, when |B1 ∩ B2| 0, it is highly likely that all the Bitcoin addresses in the set B1 ∩ B2 belong to the same SPV client.
Multiple Bloom Filters.
In the previous paragraphs, we discussed the case where the adversary is equipped with only two Bloom filters. Note that our analysis equally applies to the case where the adversary possesses any number b > 2 of Bloom filters pertaining to the same entity.
As mentioned earlier, by computing the intersection between each pair of filters, the adversary can find common elements to different filters; this also enables the adversary to guess with high confidence whether different filters have been generated by the same client. Given b filters which belong to the same SPV client, the adversary can compute the number of elements inserted within each filter using Equation 4 . In the sequel, we assume that filters B1, . . . , Note that |K1| ≤ |K2| · · · ≤ |K (b−1) |. Here, the larger the number of Bloom filters at the disposal of the adversary, the smaller is the error of the adversary in correctly classifying the genuine addresses of the SPV client, and the larger is P h (.) . That is, the larger is b, the smaller are the number of common false positives that are exhibited by the different filters, and the higher is the confidence of the adversary in identifying the false positives of Bj. Following Equation 12 ,
Moreover, as j increases, Kj will contain more false positives, and P h (j) will decrease.
Experimental Evaluation
In what follows, we experimentally validate our analysis in Section 5.1. For that purpose, we rely on a similar setup to the one used in Section 4.2, and we perform four different experiments. We perform all four experiments by setting the target false positive rate Pt to 0.05%, 0.1% and 0.5%, respectively.
In our first experiment (Experiment 1), we create 10 different user wallets, each generating five different Bloom filter B1,B2,. . . , B5 with the same size and using the same random seed r, but each having a different number of elements N = {25, 30, 35, 40, 45}.
This corresponds to the case where 10 different users constantly insert new Bitcoin addresses and update their outsourced Bloom filters. Here, we assume that our adversary captures all 50 Bloom filters and applies our analysis described in Section 5.1 to learn additional information about the user addresses. In this experiment, we compute I1 = B1 ∩ B5 for each SPV client; we then report the average intersection size for all 10 wallets in Table 3 .
Our results in Table 3 show that Bloom filters pertaining to the same SPV client, and which share the same initial seed, are likely to exhibit the same false positives (in addition to the elements inserted in the Bloom filter). Indeed, our results show that |I1|-measured experimentally-matches Equation 9 , irrespective of the target Pt; moreover, in this case, P h (.) obtained using b = 2 Bloom filters (cf. Equation 13 ) is similar to P h (.) when b = 1 one Bloom filter.
In our second experiment (Experiment 2), we extend our evaluation to account for the case where Bloom filters originating from the same user have different sizes. Here, we also create 10 different user wallets, each generating five different Bloom filters B1,B2,. . . , B5 using the same random seed, but each having a different number of elements (respectively N = {70, 120, 170, 220, 270}) and different sizes (M ranges between 3224 and 9680 bits). Analogously to Experiment 1, we compute I2 = B1 ∩ B5 for each SPV client; we then report the average intersection size for all 10 wallets in Table 3 . Additionally, we compute the intersection set I3 shared by B1 from the first wallet, with a randomly chosen Bloom filter from the remaining 9 wallets. In Table 5 , we report the average intersection set size over the 9 wallets. Our results in Tables 3 and 5 confirm our aforementioned analysis. Indeed, |I2| matches the values derived using Equation 12 when the Bloom filters pertain to the same user. Otherwise, |I3| matches Equation 6 .
In our third experiment (Experiment 3), we investigate the case where Bloom filters pertaining to the same user are initialized with different random seeds. As mentioned earlier, this, e.g., corresponds to the case when the user restarts the SPV client. In this experiment, we create 10 different user wallets, each generating 16 different Bloom filters constructed using different initial seeds as follows: 4 filters B1,B2,B3,B4 with N = 10, N = 100, N = 1, 000, and N = 10, 000, respectively. For each wallet, and all filters of the same size, we compute I4 = B1 ∩ B4 and we report the average |I4| for each filter sizes in Table 3 . Additionally, for each filter size, we also compute the intersection set I5 using B1 from the first wallet, with a randomly chosen Bloom filter from all other 9 wallets. In Table 5 , we report the average intersection set size over the 9 wallets. Similar to Experiment 2, our results in Table 3 show that, irrespective of the filter size, and of the target false positive rate, P h (.) significantly decreases when the adversary acquires b = 2 Bloom filters pertaining to the same SPV client.
Finally, in our final experiment (Experiment 4), we investigate the impact of having b > 2 Bloom filters pertaining to the same SPV client. For that purpose, we use 5 Bloom filters B1,B2,. . . ,B5 generated using different seeds with N = {3070, 3120, 3170, 3220 , 3270}. We then compute Kj = B1 ∩· · ·∩B (j+1) , ∀j ∈ [1, b−1], and the corresponding P h (.) using Equation 15 . Our findings are depicted in Table 4 ; our results validate our aforementioned analysis and show that the larger the number b of acquired Bloom filters of the same SPV client, the larger is P h (.) , and the smaller is the privacy of the user's addresses.
Summary.
• In Experiments 1,2, and 3, notice that |I3| ≈ |I5| min(m1,m2) 2 . This means that given any two Bloom filters B1 and B2, if |B1 ∩ B2| min(m1,m2) 2
(estimated using Equation 1), then Table 3 : Measuring |Bi ∩ Bj| and P h (.) in Experiments 1,2, and 3, using filters of the same SPV client with respect to N and Pt. Here, mi ≤ mj. Each data point is averaged over 10 independent runs; we also present the 95% confidence intervals. an adversary can easily tell whether any two Bloom filters pertain to the same SPV client.
• If the two Bloom filters acquired by the adversary belong to the same SPV client, the adversary can identify whether the SPV client has restarted while generating his Bloom filters; here, notice that
• P h (.) corresponding to b = 2 filters is considerably larger when compared to the case where the adversary has access to one Bloom filter. This means that an adversary which can acquire more than one Bloom filter pertaining to an SPV client can learn considerable information about the addresses of the node-irrespective of the size of the Bloom filter and Pt. In this case, our results show that P h (N ) approaches 1, which signals full leakage of the addresses of the SPV client. P h (.) increases to 1 as the number b of Bloom filters of the same SPV client captured by the adversary increases.
OUR PROPOSED SOLUTION
Given our findings, we propose in what follows a solution that enhances the privacy of SPV clients which rely on Bloom filters. Before presenting our solution, we briefly summarize our observations from Sections 4 and 5.
Observation 1: The number of elements inserted within a Bloom filter significantly affects the resulting false positive rate of the filter. This is especially true when the filter's size is modest (e.g., < 500). Indeed, the number of elements inserted in the filter should match at all times the filter's size in order to achieve the target false positive rate (i.e., P f (m) = Pt). Observation 2: The acquisition of multiple Bloom filters considerably reduces the privacy of SPV clients. The construction of multiple Bloom filters per SPV client should be avoided.
Otherwise, different Bloom filters should be constructed with different initial seeds, and should contain different elements. In this way, an adversary does not gain considerable advantage when acquiring two or more Bloom filters. Observation 3: SPV clients should keep state about their outsourced Bloom filters (i.e., on persistent storage) to avoid the need to re-compute a filter which contains the same elements using different parameters. Observation 4: As mentioned earlier, inserting both the public key and the public key hash (the address) in the Bloom filter provides a sufficient distinguisher for the adversary in guessing whether an address is a true positive or not. Note that for the most common transaction type Pubkey Hash (P2PKH), inserting the hash of the public key is sufficient. However, there might be other transaction types where it is beneficial to also store the public key in the Bloom filter. In this case, the client can insert either a Bitcoin address or its corresponding public key (but not both) in the same Bloom filter. Indeed, sample experimental results that we conducted show that for almost 99% of all addresses in the network, it suffices to insert either the public key or the public key hash within the same Bloom filter in order to receive all the relevant transactions destined to the address.
Our Solution.
In what follows, we describe a solution which leverages Observations 1, 2, 3, and 4. In our solution, each SPV client generates N Bitcoin addresses at the start, and embeds them in a Bloom filter which can fit M = m = N . Here, the Bloom filter is constructed with a realistic target false positive rate Pt, which combined with N and M , results in a target privacy level (cf. Equation 3). Note that since M = m, then we ensure that the Bloom filter's false positive rate matches Pt (cf. Section 4). Here, we assume that only the address is inserted within each filter.
Clearly, since the user might not directly use all N addresses, some of his Bitcoin addresses will not be revealed and will remain in his wallets. Whenever users run out of their N addresses and need to get additional addresses, they repeat the aforementioned setup process. That is, users create an additional set of N addresses and embed them in a new Bloom filter-constructed with a new initial seed-with M = m = N , and using the previously chosen Pt. Here, the advantage of an adversary which captures one or more Bloom filters pertaining to the same SPV client is negligible, since these filters do not have any element in common.
Additionally, our solution requires the SPV clients to keep state, e.g., about each Bloom filter, to avoid the need of re-computation of the same filter if the client restarts at any point in time. We point out that the required storage overhead to maintain information about the state of each Bloom filter is negligible. Indeed, to keep all the necessary state to reconstruct a Bloom filter, an SPV client needs to locally store: (i) the number of addresses embedded in the filer (4 bytes), (ii) the used target false positive rate Pt (8 bytes), (iii) the used seed value (8 bytes), (iv) the BloomUpdate flag (2 bytes), and (v) the addresses inserted in the filter. The SPV client can add a pointer in the ECKey class of Bitcoinj in order to link each Bitcoin address to the Bloom filter that embeds it; the size of the pointer is roughly 2 bytes per address. This amounts to a total storage of 2N + 20 bytes per Bloom filter. For example, when N = 100, the SPV client needs to store an additional 220 bytes per Bloom filter in order to reconstruct the filter upon restart; clearly, this overhead can be easily tolerated in existing SPV client implementations.
Clearly, our proposed solution can be directly integrated within existing SPV clients, and only incurs in small modifications to existing client implementations. Moreover, our solution does not incur additional overhead on the SPV clients-apart from the pregeneration of N Bitcoin addresses (which is only done at setup time), and the storage space required for each generated Bloom filter. Note that our solution requires SPV clients to outsource all their filters to full Bitcoin nodes since different filters embed different sets of their addresses. Therefore, N should be carefully chosen. If a user needs many addresses, choosing a larger N would avoid the generation of a larger number of Bloom filters. We leave the task of finding the best parameters when constructing a Bloom filter as an interesting direction for future work. Since users typically have few hundred Bitcoin addresses, we argue that this overhead can be largely tolerated given the current usage patterns in Bitcoin. Notice that the larger is N , the smaller are the number of Bloom filters created by the SPV client. Note that, in our solution, an SPV client should not outsource more than one Bloom filter to each regular node that it connects to. Indeed, if the client outsources several filters to the same node, then the regular node can correlate these filters (even if they do not embed the same elements). Figure 6 : Evaluation of our countermeasure. Here, we measure P h (1) and P h (N ) given Pt = 0.05 and assuming the current SPV client implementation. In computing P h (1) , we assume that the SPV client did not restart since initialization.
In Figure 6 , we analytically compute P h given our countermeasure. Clearly, our countermeasure considerably decreases P h , especially for clients that have a small number of addresses.
Additional Insights.
We point out that an adversary which has access to the Bitcoin block chain can observe that Bitcoin addresses which recently were used by an SPV client do match the Bloom filter of that client. This knowledge clearly reduces the privacy of newly used addresses. Here, we stress that every newly used address of an SPV client is likely to match the Bloom filters of a fraction Pt of all other SPV clients. In our solution, Pt therefore defines the minimum anonymity set size of each address.
One alternative would be to embed existing Bitcoin addresses that do not belong to the node, when constructing each Bloom filter. Subsequently, whenever an SPV client needs to generate a new Bitcoin address, it will choose a Bitcoin address which matches its existing Bloom filter 7 . However, this alternative also results in an anonymity set defined by Pt; it also comes at the expense of computational overhead incurred on the SPV clients. In an experiment that we conducted using a Bloom filter Bt of size 1608 bits with Pt = 0.05% and m = 102, we were able to generate three new Bitcoin addresses which match Bt; these addresses were found after 240,351, 415,877, and 5,767,346 tries, respectively.
Moreover, we point out that our analysis and solution do not address the case where the adversary can link addresses by using sidechannel information from the Bitcoin block chain, namely:
Filtering false positives by date: SPV clients only appeared in the second half of 2011, which is 1.5 years after Bitcoin started. Therefore, if a Bitcoin address which was created before 2011 matches the Bloom filter of an SPV client, the adversary can label it, with high confidence, to be a false positive, and not a Bitcoin address of the node. However, we note that the number of addresses created from 2011 exceeds by far that corresponding to the period from 2009-2011, during which Bitcoin was still not widely used at the time. Clustering Bitcoin addresses: The adversary can make use of techniques such as [9, 15, 19 ] to link/cluster certain Bitcoin addresses based on user behavior, transaction amounts, etc., and assess whether an address matching a Bloom filter is a false positive or a true positive. Here, we point out that our proposed solution can be used in conjunction with existing solutions such as [8, 20] to prevent the linking/clustering of addresses using such techniques.
RELATED WORK
User Privacy in Bitcoin: Bitcoin has received considerable attention from the research community [3, 10, [14] [15] [16] 18] . In [9] , Androulaki et al. evaluate user privacy in Bitcoin and show that Bitcoin leaks considerable information about the profiles of user. In [4] , Elias investigates the legal aspects of privacy in Bitcoin. In [23] , Reid and Harrigan explore user anonymity limits in Bitcoin. In [24] , Ron and Shamir investigate how users move BTCs between their various accounts in order to better protect their privacy. In [19] , the authors investigated the possibility of linking addresses of the same user together by utilizing the Bitcoin peers network address information (IPs). Miers et al. introduced in [20] ZeroCoin, a cryptographic extension to Bitcoin that augments the protocol to prevent the tracing of coin expenditure. In [8] , Androulaki and Karame proposed an extension of ZeroCoin to hide the transaction values and address balances in the system. Privacy in Bloom Filters: As far as we are aware, Mullin et al. [21] were the first to propose an estimate the false positive rate of Bloom filters. In [13] , Christensen et al. propose a novel technique for computing the false positive rate, which results in tighter estimates when compared to [21] . In [11] , Bianchi et. al quantify the privacy properties of Bloom filters; their analysis, however, does not address the privacy provisions when the adversary has access to multiple Bloom filters originating from the same entity. In [22] , Nojima et. al, propose a cryptographically secure privacy-preserving Bloom-filtering protocol based on blind signatures; this proposal, however, incurs additional computational load on SPV nodes.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the privacy provisions due to the integration of Bloom filters in SPV clients. Our results show that Bloom filters incur serious privacy leakage in existing SPV client implementations. More specifically, we show that a considerable number of the addresses of users of SPV clients which possess a modest number of Bitcoin addresses (e.g., < 20) are leaked by a single Bloom filter. Moreover, we show that a considerable number of the addresses of users is leaked if the adversary can collect two different Bloom filters issued by the same node, irrespective of the target false positive rate of the filter, and of the number of addresses owned by the user. Finally, we propose a lightweight solution that enhances the privacy offered by Bloom filters; our proposal can be integrated within existing SPV client implementations with minimum modifications.
